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Farm Politics  and the  Separation
of  Powers
By  Charles M. Hardin
PRESIDENT  vs.  CONGRESS
Every President  has had trouble  with Congress.  The  friction
began in Washington's first term and continues in the Eisenhower
administration.
Presidential-Congressional  difficulties  are rooted  in the  Con-
stitution.  "All legislative  power herein granted  shall be vested  in
a  Congress  of  the  United  States..."  begins  Article  I.  But  the
President  must approve  legislation  unless  his veto is  overridden
by two-thirds of each House.  Actually,  the President has become
"chief legislator."  He is also the nation's chief  in foreign  affairs,
commander-in-chief  of the  armed  forces,  and  chief  administra-
tor.  Indeed,  Article  II  begins,  "The  executive  power  shall  be
vested in a President  of the United States."  Yet two-thirds of the
Senate must approve all treaties.  Congress must provide and sup-
port  the  armed  forces  and  make  rules  for  their  governance.
Under  the  practice  of  "senatorial  courtesy"  the  senior  Senator
of the President's  party controls presidential  appointments  in his
state. The canny Founding Fathers underwrote the  separation  of
powers  by giving each  power  a word in  the management  of the
other's  affairs.
Sometimes  President and Congress  cooperate;  sometimes  one
blocks  the  other;  and  again  one  forces  the  other's  hand.  Fre-
quently,  they vie  for  leadership.  The  separation  of  powers  does
not  mean that  Congress  makes  the  laws  and that  the President
enforces  them.  Rather,  it means  "that one  branch  will  be  open
for contesting  the control  that has previously  been established  in
the other branch."  1
How  serious  for  the  American  political  system  is  the  recur-
rent  friction  between  President  and  Congress?  To  discuss  this
question,  we  must  ask,  first,  whether  the  general  public  is  dis-
turbed  by  the  problem?  The  immediate  answer  is  "no."  The
public is little informed about or interested  in such matters. The
1Pendleton  Herring,  Presidential Leadership, Rinehart  and  Company,  1940,  p. 8.
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Presidential-Congressional  relationships  must  be  infinitesimal.
If the public is massively  indifferent  to the problem,  its elec-
toral  behavior  has  some  bearing  on  Presidential-Congressional
relationships.  Even in the  1952 presidential election,  only 63  per-
cent of the adults voted; but some 4,000,000 more of them voted
for presidential candidates than for Congressmen.  Let us contrast
presidential  and  mid-term  Congressional  elections.  In  the  six
presidential  elections since  1932, an average of 48,700,000 voted.
How alarmed should we be?  Highly competent  analysts-the
"standpatters"-pooh-pooh  these fears.  One writer considers  the
electoral  college  a  dangerous  anomaly,  but  finds  the  domestic
operations  of  the American  Constitution  generally  satisfactory;
however,  the conduct  of foreign affairs  "discloses  a fundamental
defect  in the American  political system."  2
Others-the  "reformers"-say  that  the  situation  calls  for
changes, more or less drastic.  Some  reformers merely  favor crea-
tion of majority and minority policy committees in Congress,  the
provision  that cabinet  members  may be  questioned  on  the  floor
of  Congress,  and  the  elimination  both  of  senatorial  filibusters
and  also  of the designation  of committee  chairmen  by seniority.
Going  farther,  others  would  do  away with  mid-term  elections,
arguing  that  if  Congress  and  the  President  stand  together  for
election  a  more  responsible  national  government-one  less  sub-
ject  to  local  pressures-will  emerge.  Going  still  farther,  some
would  give  us  government  by a  cabinet subject  to votes  of  con-
fidence in Congress;  as in Great Britain, the cabinet would either
resign  on an adverse vote or would  dissolve Congress  and  appeal
to the country  in a  general  election  on the  issues.
Nearly  all  reformers  want  to stress  the  judgment  of  the na-
tional  electorate  upon  the national  government  for  its  national
program  and  diminish  the  weight  of  local  electoral  judgments
upon  local  Congressmen  respecting  local  issues.  They  want  the
high-powered  engines  of government to concentrate on big prob-
lems rather than  little ones  (for  the  Congress  to appropriate  for
janitorial  service  in  the  Alaskan  Governor's  mansion  is  worse
than using a bulldozer to weed the garden).  Finally,  reformers  in
general  assume  the need to strengthen political parties and make
2A.  N.  Holcombe,  Our  More Perfect  Union,  Harvard  University  Press,  Cam-
bridge,  Massachusetts,  1950,  pp.  107,  426  et  passim.
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will  be  better  able  to fix  responsibility;  in  short,  it means party
government.
Reformer  or standpatter-who  is right? The latter can point
to predictions  of disaster which history has not borne  out. Alex-
ander Hamilton write:  "Mine  is an odd destiny. Perhaps no man
in the United  States has sacrificed  or  done more  for  the present
Constitution  than  myself;  and  contrary  to  my  anticipations  of
its fate,...  I  am  still  laboring  to  prop  the  frail  and  worthless
fabric."  No  prophet  of  disaster  could  be  more  eminent  than
Hamilton.  No  one  could  have  been  more  wrong.
True  enough,  say  the  reformers,  but  times  change.  As  crisis
spawns  crisis,  governmental  programs  must  be  more  coherent;
policy  conflicts  must be minimized.  What kind of conflicts?  Buy-
American legislation,  quotas, tariff barriers,  and complicated cus-
toms administration-all  embarrass  our  international  trade  pol-
icies.  The  immigration  act  is  a  standing  affront  to  our  allies.
Despite  an  internationally  minded  administration,  the  doctrine
of isolationism continues  to be  advanced in high places at critical
moments.  Antitrust  policy  sometimes  handicaps  the  conduct  of
foreign  affairs.  Domestically,  budget  balancing  is  bedevilled  by
armed-service  pressures  and  by  traditional  logrolling.  National
farm  policy  prices  some  commodities  out  of  the  market  at  the
same time that it stimulates  their production.  Taxes unduly bur-
den some businesses and indefensibly  benefit others. The  1950-51
conflict  of  the  Treasury  versus  Federal  Reserve  Board  was  re-
solved  but  only  after  inflation  had  been  given  a  further  boost.
When  free enterprise  in  thought is sorely needed,  federal inquisi-
tions  threaten  to  turn each  man against  his neighbor  and  to un-
dermine  civil  liberties.
We  need not search  for  elusive  criteria  to  judge  between  re-
formers  and  standpatters.  Both  agree  that  the  American  system
of government  is hard to  work.  Given the  interests  to  be  accom-
modated and the ends  to be reconciled,  it could not be otherwise.
The harder a  political system  is to work,  the more important  it is
to have an intelligent grasp of it.  Educators in  the field of public
policy  are  especially  obligated  to  improve  the  public's  grasp  of
the  political  system.  Agricultural  extension  workers  have  a  pe-
culiar  duty  to interpret  the  role  of farm  politics  in that  system.
What  is  its  significance  for  the  separation  of  powers?
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TO  THE  PRESIDENT
Farmers in the United  States are  better  represented  in Con-
gress  than  in  the  President.  Congress  is  the  natural  forum  for
organized  agriculture  to  make  its  political  gains.  Farm  leaders
profess  to  fear  executive  rather  than  legislative  tyranny.  Let
us  examine  each  of these propositions.
REPRESENTATION.  Farmers are heavily overrepresented in the
federal  Senate  and  will  remain  so  unless  by  a  miracle  urban
population becomes equally distributed among 48 states. The 435
seats  of the  House  of Representatives  are reapportioned  among
the  states  according  to  population  after  each  decennial  census.
States  entitled  to  more  than  one  Congressman  are  required
by federal law to be divided  into Congressional  districts.  But the
districting  agents  are  state  legislatures,  which  are  commonly
dominated  by  rural  and  small-town  members.  The  frequent
consequence  is  that legislatures  either  refuse to redistrict  or  else
draw  the  lines  so  that  urban  areas  are  disadvantaged.  Thus
235 rural and small-town Congressional  districts average  283,000
population  while  122  urban  districts  average  331,000.
If rural and small-town areas are overrepresented  in the Con-
gress,  so are the great metropolitan areas in presidential elections.
The  candidate  who barely  wins  the popular  vote in a state  still
gets its total electoral  vote. The winner needs 266  electoral votes.
Eight  states,3 all with  great  cities,  all  being  "close  states"  have
213 electoral votes.  It is easy to see that these states, plus the votes
that  either  party  can  usually  count  on  would  be  enough  for
victory.  This  extremely  simple  arithmetic  illuminates  somewhat
the actual working of our Constitution;  the President's electorate
is  different  from  that  of  Congress;  it  is  urban-dominated  and
much larger.
THE  CONGRESS:  AGRICULTURE'S  POLITICAL  FORUM.  Con-
gress,  then, is  the natural  channel  of access  for  farm politicians.
This is true,  even  though the modern need  for  executive  leader-
ship  is  very  great  in agricultural  policy,  as  in  other  fields.  The
farm  vote  no  longer  determines  which  party  will  control  the
House,  the Senate-or  the Presidency,  for that matter.  But the
3New  York,  California,  Pennsylvania,  Illinois,  Ohio,  Michigan,  New  Jersey,  and
Massachusetts.
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often  gives  them  the  seniority  necessary  to  become  committee
chairmen.  Naturally,  Wesley  McCune found  the  "center  of  op-
erations"  of the farm bloc  to be  Congress.4
The  original  agricultural  bloc,  formed  in  Congress  in  1921,
pressed  successfully  for regulation  of the packers and  stockyards
and grain  exchanges  as  well  as for liberalization  of farm  credit.
In  1926  and  1927,  Congress  passed McNary-Haugen  Bills twice.
In  1933,  the widely felt emergency  dictated the rapid enactment
of the original Agricultural Adjustment Act,  although the Senate
almost tacked  on a cost-of-production  amendment.  Congress  re-
captured  leadership  in agricultural  legislation  in  1934  with  the
Bankhead  (cotton)  and the Kerr  (tobacco)  Acts.  In the  confu-
sion following the judicial  liquidation  of the  first AAA,  the  Soil
Conservation  and  Domestic  Allotment  Act  was  passed.  "Secre-
tary  Wallace  and  the farm  leaders  drafted  the  legislation,  the
President blessed  it, and Congress made it the law of the land."  6
The  Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  of  1938  was  a  compromise
between  the administration  bill in the House  and the Farm Bu-
reau's bill in the Senate.  In  1941,  Congress  again took charge of
agricultural  policy  by  raising  Commodity  Credit  Corporation
loan rates on basic agricultural  commodities  to a flat  85  percent
of  parity.  Meanwhile,  Congress  was  beginning  to  override  the
President's  budget  for  the  United  States  Department  of  Agri-
culture-1939  foreshadowed  1953  in this  respect.  The  agricul-
tural  appropriation  for  fiscal  1940  was  increased  $353,000,000
over  the President's  request.  That  year  Congress  cut  all  other
budget  estimates,  except  for the  civil  functions  of  the War  De-
partment-the  pork  barrel.
During World  War  II,  the President  and  the  farm  bloc  in
Congress  were frequent  antagonists.  The first  explosion  came in
1942  after  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt's  famous  Labor  Day  message
which told Congress to permit price ceilings  on agricultural com-
modities at parity by October 1-"In the event that the Congress
should fail to act, and act adequately,  I shall accept  the respon-
sibility, and I will act." When the smoke cleared, the administra-
tion had won a partial victory.  In 1943, Congress passed the Bank-
head Bill to raise farm parity, Roosevelt vetoed it, and the Senate
4The  Farm  Bloc,  Doubleday,  Doran  and  Company,  Garden  City,  New  York,
1943,  p.  1.
50.  R.  Altman,  "Second  Session  of  the  74th  Congress,"  American  Political
Science Review,  December  1936,  pp.  1086,  ff.  at p.  1096
182referred  his message  to the Committee  on Agriculture  and  For-
estry  without  action;  that  is,  the  Senate  maintained  the  threat
to override  the veto. The  President bitterly criticized  this "shot-
gun-behind-the-door,"  but  to  no  avail.  In  1944,  Congress  at-
tempted  to repeal  the  consumer  subsidy program  but  failed  to
override  the  President's  veto;  and  so  it went.
Throughout recent years,  the farm  politician's love  for Con-
gress  has  usually been matched  by his distrust  of  the  executive.
The President was suspected of preferring the interests of business
in the  twenties,  or labor in  the late  thirties.  President  Harding
opposed  the  original  farm  bloc,  and President  Coolidge  deftly
removed  its floor  leader,  Senator Kenyon,  by appointing him to
the federal bench.  In  1925,  Coolidge  appeared  at the American
Farm  Bureau  Federation  Convention,  where  he  was  given  a
"great build-up  ..  ."  But his address, urging farmers to rely upon
free  enterprise  tempered  by  cooperation,  "fell  on the  audience
like a wet blanket....  applause was notably slight and the atmos-
phere  chilly and  barely respectful."6 As with other  policy prob-
lems,  Franklin D. Roosevelt relied heavily on farm groups in the
making of farm policy;  and his honeymoon with  agriculture  was
protracted.  In  1935,  the  American  Farm  Bureau  Convention
cheered  him to the echo.  But rural  midwestern  defections  from
the New  Deal,  which  began  in  some  sections  in  1936,  swelled
greatly in  1938  and  1940.  The  honeymoon  was  over.
In  1948,  many  midwestern  farmers  voted  Democratic,  al-
though their  influence  in  the Truman  victory  has been  greatly
exaggerated,  and it is  a nice  question whether their love for the
one  or their fear  of the other  motivated  the  vote.  Then  Messrs.
Truman  and  Brannan  departed  from  the  Rooseveltian  method
of group  consultation  in  formulating  farm  policy;  the Brannan
Plan was evolved within the administration,  so far as counseling
with farm groups was  concerned.  Nor were  Congressional  lead-
ers  advised.  The  Farm  Bureau  broke  with  the  administration,
and  Congress  took  charge  once  more  of  farm  policy.
FARM  ORGANIZATION  VIEWS.  Spokesmen  of  the  American
Farm Bureau  Federation,  with  1,500,000  family members,  by all
odds  the  largest  farm  organization,  have  obligingly  expressed
their  preference  for  Congress.  Allan  Kline,  President  of  the
AFBF,  declared,
60.  M.  Kile,  The  Farm Bureau Through Three Decades, Waverly  Press,  Balti-
more,  1948,  p.  109.
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would  be  freedom  by  sufferance.  Its name  is  benevolent  dictator-
ship.  It is not  freedom  at  all.  Insofar  as  freedom  is  guaranteed  by
a political  system,  it  is  guaranteed  by legislative  bodies,  elected  by
and  freely  responsible  to  the  citizens.  True  freedom  is  freedom
under  law.7
President H. E. Slusher of the Missouri Farm Bureau recently
praised the power of farmers in Congress and the control by Con-
gress  of  the  government,  although  he  expressed  alarm  at  the
recent  growth  of  government  by  executive  decree.  George  H.
Wilson  of the California Farm  Bureau has attributed  the  rise  of
Hitler to the subversion  of the legislature by the executive.  In its
1952 resolutions, the AFBF proclaimed "the Principles of Democ-
racy and the Philosophy of Government"  essentially as providing
that  the  individual  shall  be  able  to make  what  he  can  and  do
what he will.  The AFBF  urged,  among  other things,  "Restraint
by Congress  in enlarging  the  powers  of  the  executive  branch  of
the  federal  government."  And  the  Farm  Bureau  has  supported
the Bricker Amendment  which  proposes  severe  limitations  upon
the  power of  the President in foreign  affairs.
Like  the  Farm  Bureau,  the  National  Grange  opposes  "un-
warranted  assumption  of power  by  the  Executive Branch."  Ap-
parently  neither  the  Grange  nor the Farm  Bureau  leaders  have
been  concerned  about  the  possibilities  of  legislative  tyranny.
Finally,  the Grange,  the  Farm  Bureau,  and  the National  Coop-
erative  Milk  Producers Federation  have  all  proposed  at various
times the establishment  of national  agricultural  bi-partisan  com-
missions; the ostensible aim has been to take farm programs  "out
of  politics";  the  almost  inevitable  effect  would  be  to  reduce  or
eliminate  control  of farm  policy  by  the  federal  executive.  Only
the National  Farmers  Union  has  rather  consistently  applauded
the President and his administration  in recent Democratic  years.
INTERPRETATION
Presidential-Congressional  friction,  considerable  at  best,  is
increased  by farm politics.  The major farm groups work out their
compromises  in  Congress, which  is peculiarly  agriculture's  polit-
ical  forum.  It would  be  easy,  though  deceptive,  to attribute  re-
cent  rifts  between  Democratic  administrations  and  farm leaders
to  the  Republican  leanings  of  the  latter.  Many  farm  leaders-
7Presidential  Address,  AFBF  Convention,  1948.
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gladly welcomed the Eisenhower victory in  1952. In the twenties,
however,  farm  politicians  clashed  repeatedly  with  Republican
Presidents.
This  perennial  conflict  springs  (partly,  at  least)  from  the
overrepresentation  of agriculture  in the  Congress  and  its under-
representation in the executive.  Few political analysts will accept
"agricultural  fundamentalism"  as  a  justification  for  the  over-
representation  of  farmers  in legislatures.  They will  be  more im-
pressed  by the  balance thus  achieved  between  a  President  with
a metropolitan  base and a Congress with a rural  and small-town
base.  But it may be a dangerous  balance.  The President  and the
House  of Representatives,  at least,  might  be made  to rest upon
essentially  the same  kind  of  electorate.  President  and  Congress
would still check  upon each  other.  But the  friction between  the
President and the House  of Representatives  would no  longer in-
crease the tension between  metropolitan populations  and the rest
of America. Farmers might lose some of the fruits of their present
overrepresentation;  but they would  have  little to  fear from  the
oppression of a "unified"  urban interest. For the "urban interest"
is  normally  divided  and  subdivided  among  employers  and  em-
ployees,  landlords  and  renters,  debtors and  creditors,  union  and
nonunion,  and  producers  and  distributors.  Income  and  educa-
tional levels divide the "urban interest"; so, it must be admitted,
do religion,  national  origins,  and ethnic  derivations.  Indeed,  the
highly differentiated urban population will only be solidified into
one interest by the emergence  of a joint sentiment of unremitting
common adversity-such  as  might be  created  from  the cumula-
tive  disadvantages  of  underrepresentation  in  state  and national
legislatures.
The present  confrontation  has  other dangers.  These  may  be
seen in the different regard in which  Congress  and the President
are  held.  Many  individual  Congressmen  and  Senators  are  re-
spected or admired by a considerable  group in their own  elector-
ates; but elsewhere,  they are usually strangers,  even "foreigners."
The  reputation  of Congress  as a whole  suffers  from  its size  and
from the brawling,  quarrelsome quality of its proceedings--qual-
ities  that  are  signs  of  life  in  a  democratic  legislature.  But  the
President  speaks  with  one  voice  and under  the  best  of circum-
stances.  He occupies  the national  pulpit.  He  is  the nation's  first
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him-one  can  either  love  him or hate him  with  great  satisfac-
tion.  In crises,  all  eyes  turn toward  him.  His  election  brings  out
by far our largest  vote.  This is  why some  think of the people  as
being  "embodied"  in the  President.  In  pondering  this interpre-
tation,  farm  leaders  should  ask  themselves,  first,  whether  it  is
really  good for the country  to maintain  unmodified  the present
separate  political  bases  for  the  President  and  Congress,  and,
second, whether in the long run it is good for farmers  to be iden-
tified with  the Congress  and  against the President.
Finally,  a  somewhat  different  point  needs  to  be  made.  In
championing  Congress, farm politicians often fail  to see the need
in our governmental  system  for vigorous  executive  leadership-
even  though  this  need  has  been  demonstrated  in  agricultural
policy  itself.  It is  not  surprising  that  most reformers  seek  to  in-
crease Presidential  leadership,  and also  to make  it more  respon-
sible  by joining  it with  a legislative  council  of some  kind.  What
is  perhaps  more  impressive  is  the  unanimity  among  the  stand-
patters  in  recognizing  the need  for  strong  executive  leadership.
The  American  Constitution  separates  the  powers,  but  it  also
enjoins  a  spirit  of cooperation  in  statesmen,  whether  legislators
or Presidents,  so that  the  ends laid  down  in the  preamble  may
be  achieved.  In  stridently claiming supremacy  for  the Congress,
farm  statesmen  do  not  render  full  justice  to  the  spirit  of  the
Constitution.
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